

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
MISSION FOR GERMANY
United States Forces
European Theater

2118
Confidential
7 September 1945

TO: Lt. Williams, WAC
Deputy Chief, SCI, CIB, USFET

FROM: Major T. F. Purner, *JP*
Deputy Chief, USAF-2, Germany

SUBJECT: FECHNER

1. Lt. Colonel Rothschild on 7 August submitted to Counter-Sabotage Section, Operations Group, G-2, CIB, USFET, a letter of five questions which were embodied in Colonel Berding's interrogation brief of 9 August to Captain Tium.

2. Attached are two copies of Major King's report in reply, dated 27 August 1945.

3. Kindly transmit this report to the Counter-Sabotage Section, Operations Group, of CIB.

Encls.

2 copies of

1 copy sent to War Room - recd.

Distribution:

3 - Lt. Williams
1 - Files

Regressed CONFIDENTIAL by authority of
Col W. & LeRoy by *JP*
SEP 26 1945
E. J. L. ORDO

Confidential

SECRET

SECRET

Operations and Agents of Leitesella II Shed-
Out Line Frontaufklärung.

Attached for your information and files is a report on
the above subject prepared by Lt. Pierre HAAS, formerly French
Intelligence Officer with SOI MUNICH. The report has only recently
been translated and made available for dissemination.

John H. Brennan
1st Lt., 20th AF

ANDREW H. HANBURY
1st Lt., 20th AF
Campbell

Confidential

Remarks

: Undertaking suggested by FECHNER,
Group never left GERMANY.

NORTH AFRICA

Name of undertaking: ?

Date : (2) Probably 1942

Objective : Disruption of railroad running
from ALEXANDRIA towards DERNA

Controlling agency : Abwehr II

Directed by : Hptl SCHIFFBAUER, SSGR SCHNEIDERMAN

From where : Gruppe II, Ast ATHENS

Remarks : Executed by a group of men from
BRANDENBURG Regt, commanded by a Lt.
whose group was captured before
executing their mission.

ITALY, EGYPT, SOUTH AFRICA, AFGHANISTAN: Negative

INDIA : Name of undertaking: BAJADERE

Remarks : Activated at "Rekenburglager",
MOERWITZ under command of Ritt-
meister HARBICH. Never committed.

PERSIA: Negative

Name of undertaking: ARIADNE

12 Bearbalter, ISTANBUL

ISTANBUL

about 12 men

TRANS JORDANIA:

Date: 3/1/1943 (7)

Objective : Sabotage and subversion

Controlling agency: AB car 11

Directed by Dr SCHIEBERMANN, II-Bearbeiter ANHANG

From there

Remarks : Oberleutnant MUELLER and companions were to be landed by plane. Obstl I.G. MEYER RIX and Major Dr KOHLHAAS were in IRAQ at about this time in support of the insurrectionist premier. They brought KLUG and SAILANI with them to GERMANY.

~~©~~ SOUTH AMERICA, DENMARK, HOLLAND, BELGIUM, FRANCE: Negative.

All countries mentioned, except GREECE, were outside of FACHNER's sphere of activities. His statements as to his ignorance of operations in the countries indicated can be considered as true.

c. Names and cover names of all A-1 and A-1D Agents, with data as to their use and controlling officers:

Only a small number of agents were actually known to be active in the area. Wirtschaftstrant, Ernststraße 30114 and St. 11, rue II Suedost, 11111, he had no personal contact with agents whatsoever. All information only obtained can be by way of their subordinate officers. The following agents were known to

[illegible]

_____ given all the cover names he has used _____

1. The official position was that of an
2. in the contact with Guevara

100

2533
403
SUI THIRD ARMY
APO 403

Confidential

23 August 1945

SUBJECT: Operations and Agents of Leitstelle II Sud-Ost für
Frontaufklärung
TO : C. C., X-2 Germany

1. The attached report, subject as above, is a translation
by Mrs. Burrell of the French original by Lt. Pierre M. Haas.

Declassified CONFIDENTIAL by authority of
Col W. S. Leroy by [signature]
MAR 28 1964

Confidential

Confidential

COPY

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Interrogation Section

27 August 1945

SUBJECT: Directed Interrogation - of Oberstl FLECHNER, ATC 1414

TO : Capt Eric TILM, SCI Munich

1. FECHNER was interrogated in accordance with brief, USFAT, OSS Mission for Germany, X-2 Branch, dated 9 August 1945.

2. The following answers were elicited:

a. Full details of attempts to sabotage British sniping in St GEORGE'S DAY, GREECE at the beginning of the war: Negative. FECHNER was not in a position of sufficient importance in Abwehr at that time.

b. List of all undertakings known to FECHNER in or concerning Greece:

PLACE Name of undertaking: OLIVIA

Date : During 1940

Objective : Sabotage of important installations

Controlling agency : Gruppe II, Ast WIEN

Directed by : Abwehr II, through Maj PUTZ, Ast WIEN

From where : Gruppe II, Ast FLZ

Remarks : To be executed by Sonderführer SCHNEIDER and Gefr. WIKOLITS, both of Ast WIEN. Both agents were arrested by the Greek police before being able to execute their mission. They were later released through intervention of SKITZ, Attache at the German legation in ATHENS. Were then expelled from GREECE.

Name of undertaking: KINO

April 1945

Reactivation of R-Net in Greece

SOI FUELPHI

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

23 July 1945

SUBJECT: Operations and Agents of Leitstelle II SM4-Ost für Frontaufklärung.

TO: C.O., L-2 Germany

Introduction

Leitstelle II SM4-Ost, established in August 1944 in Vienna, descended directly from Abwehr II Vienna and from a certain number of other groups that the rapid advance of the Russian Army in Central Europe had very quickly and almost completely destroyed. It was necessary for the German intelligence and sabotage services to resume contact with the newly-occupied countries and to attempt, on the one hand, to establish relations with what remained of the old networks, and, on the other hand, to form new groups for intelligence and sabotage destined to aid the coming German counter-offensive which seems doubted, officially at least, would take place in the near future.

This last point is very important if the true nature of the operations which were attempted between August 1944 and April 1945 and the weakness of the system are to be understood. In fact, despite the turn of military events on all fronts, the official position, according to which victory would surely reward the efforts of the German people, forbade anyone to take measures providing for a German defeat, at least in an organization of this type which was very suspect in the eyes of pure Nazis. The networks of the Leitstelle are not, therefore, technically stay-behind networks despite the fact that the agents were operating behind the Russian lines.

There was, consequently, a psychological handicap at the basis of the activities of the Leitstelle reflecting the contradiction in the situation within Germany.

In addition there was a more serious difficulty. The Leitstelle represented under a different name the former Abteilung II of the Abwehr and the great majority of its personnel came from that organization which had been dissolved by the Nazis in May 1944 and which the events of July 1944 had discredited in the eyes of the Nazis. If this state of mind is taken into consideration and also the fact that SM4 Amt VI B, Mil Amt B and 4 Jagdverbände had a technical and geographic sphere very similar to that of the Leitstelle and also had the confidence of the authorities in power, it will be seen that the position of the Leitstelle was anything but brilliant.

To these difficulties of a general order must be added those brought about by the relations of the Leitstelle vis-a-vis the army and the Nazi Party. In reality, the title of the Leitstelle is: "Leitstelle II SM4-Ost für Frontaufklärung". Following the conference at Salzburg in May 1944 it had been agreed that the Frontaufklärung and Kriegswachwehr would remain under the command of the Führerhauptquartier, Abteilung: "Chef Frontaufklärung und Kriegswachwehr".

CONVENDI. (This information was furnished by Major GARNIER.) The **NSDA**, however, did not give up the idea of absorbing the remaining elements of the old **Abwehr** which were still outside its authority and in the end the **Frontaufklärung** was absorbed into **NSDA Mil Amt V** which thus became the sole authority with the right to issue orders of a technical nature (*Fachliche Befehlsgewalt*). The **NSDA** retained only a vague disciplinary power. Nevertheless, the conflict between the Army and the Party remained unsettled and was not resolved except by an order of **KALTENBRUNNER** toward the end of February 1945.

At that time the very existence of the **Leitstelle** was in doubt. The efforts of **SKORINY** to obtain complete control of sabotage operations seemed about to succeed and **Amt VI B**, through **AUHER**, chief of **Referat Rumänien Amt VI B**, notified **PIFF**, chief of **Referat Rumänien** of the **Leitstelle**, that henceforth **Amt VI B** had complete control of operations for **Rumania** and that **PIFF** was not to initiate any action without first referring it to **AUHER**. To corroborate this new authority **AUHER** forbade the execution of **Operation GILL** which was already to leave for **Rumania**. Finally, at the end of April, to ratify this power an order arrived at **Fertizan** in the **Tyrol** (the evacuation center of the **Leitstelle**) to turn over without delay to **Major LOOS**, deputy chief of **Mil Amt D**, all documents concerning the operations and agents of the **Leitstelle** which had not been previously destroyed. This order was not carried out.

When Germany surrendered the **Leitstelle** had practically ceased to exist. This was true not only for the staff and the services of the **Leitstelle** but also for the networks of agents.

During the nine months of its existence the **Leitstelle** had two functions. First, it was charged with maintaining contact with the old networks in the Balkans formerly under **Gruppe II** of **Abwehrstelle Vienna** and the **Abwehrstelle** of the Balkan countries such as **Bucharest** and **Belgrade**. Second, the **Leitstelle** was to build up by means of special operations (*Unternehmen*) networks capable of sending intelligence, of preparing an atmosphere favorable to the counter-attack of the **Wehrmacht** and also of assuring the success of that counter-offensive when it took place. To achieve success in these special enterprises the **Leitstelle** was either to recruit the necessary personnel directly or to address its requests to the **Frontaufklärungskommando** and **Frontaufklärungsgruppe** which were subordinate to it although tactically responsible to **Army Groups** and **Armies** to which the **PAKs** and **PAFs** were attached. In addition, there were under the **Leitstelle** certain missions of a defensive nature such as the "**Bombenshorts**", the purpose of which was to warn of any act of sabotage which could stop traffic on the Danube.

In addition the **Leitstelle** received the documents concerning "**action group**" operations of the **PAKs** and **PAFs** which were under the jurisdiction of the **Leitstelle** or organized by groups which were working in territories related to the activities of the **Leitstelle** before the German defeat in southeast Europe. For example, **Gruppe II** of **Mil Amt Bucharest**; **Group operations**

not been used up to the moment of the German capitulation. The documents were recovered with the capture of the Leitstelle personnel at Weimar on 3 June 1945.

Work within the Leitstelle was divided among a certain number of referats which each had a geographic area of its own with technically the same mission. All the work of the three referats was supervised by Hauptmann IBSCHER, chief of operations, who was directly under Oberstleutnant FROHNER.

Operations and Agents of Referat FA1

This Referat was directed by Lieutenant FROHNER assisted by Lieutenant Hans BAUER (now at Third U.S. Army IG). The jurisdiction of the Referat included Bulgaria and Macedonia, the latter at that time taken over by Bulgaria. At the beginning, to carry out its missions, the Referat had FAX 205 which was later moved to Slovakia.

The mission of the Referat was first, to maintain contact with the network established by Unternehmen TRITON, and second, to organize Unternehmen RIG which was to supplement TRITON.

1. TRITON

Originally this operation, directed by Oberstleutnant FROHNER, had ~~only~~ ^{one} mission, namely, protecting the shipments of chrome across Bulgaria. Its headquarters were at the Wirtschaftsstelle Sofia. TRITON was directly under the Kriegsorganisation Bulgaria.

During the summer of 1943 an order arrived from OKW Abwehr II stating that, under cover of the Wirtschaftsstelle, a number of sabotage, arms and food dumps should be established in Bulgaria and Macedonia and that small groups of agents should be set up to maintain contact in case of a German retreat. The agents were also to work for the return of the Germans. For the success of this operation Bulgaria was divided into five regions and an officer or an NCO was made responsible for each region. The results were not very encouraging. Only one radio agent established and maintained contact after the German retreat. In fact, the officer responsible, who was careless and pressed for time, reported agents who did not exist to Berlin. These reports of imaginary networks of Unternehmen TRITON were recovered among the documents of the Leitstelle and sent to the SHARP Counter Intelligence War Room in London.

The only well-organized region was No. IV, Macedonia under Lieutenant FROHNER. The network of agents in this region was centered in the towns of Skopje and Kacanik. Its chief was a certain BOCHENWITSON (phonetic) alias NILAN, a silvermith in the Mohammedan quarter of Skopje. Most of his agents were Mohammedans. The radio operator for the network was KARAWANOFF (phonetic) alias KAHIL. He had received his training with the Nachrichten Regiment 506 near Vienna during the fall of 1943 and was recruited by FROHNER. He had maintained radio contact until October 1944 without sending any messages because the German command had not

group directed by MILAN and in addition to report on all important events of a political, economic and social nature. Between October 1944 and April 1945 he sent about twenty messages. He transmitted on an average of twice a week. In the radio documents of the Leitstelle found in the mountains near Pertisau after the arrest of FROHNER, ZIEGLER, PIFF, NOWAK and BAUER, KAMIL's radio plan was found but, for some unknown reason, without the call signs. According to this plan, KAMIL was in contact with WALD, the auxiliary centrale of WERA, and later with WIENE, the evacuation centrale of WERA, located at Obing in Bavaria.

At the end of February the Leitstelle thought that KAMIL was controlled by the Russians and, in fact, he had transmitted the signal arranged for in case he operated under enemy control: "Grüss an den Chef". From later messages, however, it was discovered that there had been a misunderstanding. KAMIL was only signaling that the Russian counter-espionage services made his job very difficult. KAMIL was the only serious agent of the TRITON group according to Hauptmann ZIEGLER who thinks it would be possible to re-establish contact with him by courier if not by radio.

BOGOSWITSCH (phonetic) alias MILAN: 1m64; heavy; round face; very devout Mohammedan; Albanian nationality; speaks Greek, Turkish and Albanian.

KARAMANOFF (phonetic) alias KAMIL: 1m72; 27 years old; thin; brown hair; Mohammedan; merchant in Skopje; strongly anti-communist.

2. BAR

The inefficiency of the German networks in Bulgaria necessitated the preparation of another operation by the Leitstelle which would permit the employment of the good elements of the existing network and also correct the errors of the preceding operation. This was the reason for the creation of Unter-
asst. F.R. Leutnant BAUER, at that time chief of Referat FA1, organized this operation during the autumn of 1944.

Ten agents were recruited from volunteers of the anti-communist Bulgarian movement in Vienna which was known as the Organisation Legionär. These agents were all students who came from the Bulgarian middle class. As usual the radio training of the agents was undertaken by Nachrichten Regiment 506. Two of the agents NEDELKOFF and DRAGANOFF were trained at a villa in HEDLING near Vienna and the others at Hinterbrühl near HEDLING. Instruction was mainly concerned with radio. All the students were members of a political group. German was the language employed as all the students spoke it. It was arranged, however, that certain ones would use the Bulgarian cyrillic alphabet.

There were two instructors, one a radio operator from WERA, Wachtmeister Franz HORN and the other a Feldwebel HILDEBRANDT (phonetic) who was more particularly in charge of military training. The training lasted longer for certain agents than the training originally provided for. Hinterbrühl was threatened by the Russian advance in April and the center was

evacuated to a pilot near Kirchberg in the Tyrol (in the Kitzbühl area). Because of their delay, four agents were not able to leave and were sent back to the Organisation Legionär at Duelleraheim near Vienna in April 1945. They were Boris DINOLOF alias DIN, Theodor DINOLOF alias TEDDY, Dimitar NOTEFF alias NERZ and Georai STAINOFF alias STUBS.

The agents were distributed according to the five Bulgarian zones as they had been defined at the time of Operation TRITON.

Zone I (Zone I). This zone was bounded on the north by the Danube, on the south by the Balkans, on the west by the railroad line Sofia-Pirot, and on the east by a line going north and south passing approximately through Rasgrad.

Leutnant Boris HEDELKOFF alias NORMAN was parachuted into this zone in the mountains of Murgasch 50 kms north-east of Sofia at the end of October 1944. HEDELKOFF had left Bulgaria after the arrival of the Russians and had crossed the German lines after having organized a group of anti-communist partisans of about sixty members. The group was located near Murgasch in the region where HEDELKOFF was later dropped. He had not been given radio training. He was parachuted at the same time as arms, clothing, food and money for his group. He had been given from 10 to 15 French gold pieces of 20 franc denomination and from 80,000 to 100,000 leva. Kommando KLARA, a special aviation unit, was responsible for the operation as it was for all the agents of the Leitstelle.

Until December 1944 HEDELKOFF had no means of communication. After his brother, Doitschin HEDELKOFF, and DRAGANOFF, both W/T operators, were dropped HEDELKOFF sent an average of two messages a week, a total of from twenty-five to thirty messages in all. He was to report on all outstanding political, economic and social events of importance. He had received definite orders not to undertake any sabotage or active resistance without precise orders from the German military authorities. He never received such orders. He was to develop an anti-communist movement organization in Bulgaria and was to report on the progress of this movement. The Leitstelle had promised to assist HEDELKOFF as much as possible during hostilities but nothing had been planned in case of a German defeat. Hauptmann ZINGLER believes, however, that HEDELKOFF is still active and that his anti-communist group probably has a membership of several thousands.

Zone II (Zone II). This zone is in central Bulgaria, bounded on the north by the Balkans, on the south by the Rhodope Mountains, on the west by the old Bulgarian-Yugoslavian frontier, and on the east by an extension of a line going north and south through Rasgrad.

Two agents with the aliases NERO and DIO were parachuted in this zone 60 kms south east of Vidin in northern Bulgaria at the beginning of December 1944. They had two W/T transmitting and receiving sets, one a battery set and the other for electric current. Each agent had been given 30 gold pieces (French twenty franc pieces), 100,000 leva and 50 American dollars; one Schmeisser machine gun, two pistols, and two or three grenades for destroying their equipment in case of necessity. At the same time quantity of explosive and food was dropped but exploded on landing.

The food was distributed for Boris NEDELKOFF alias NORMANN, brother of NERO whose real name was Doitschin NEDELKOFF. The latter received his radio training at MÜding and proved to be an excellent W/T operator. NERO's mission was to contact his brother and place himself under his orders. He was to transmit in Bulgarian. Together with DIO, he was to send meteorological reports.

DIO, whose real name was DRAGANOFF, was recruited by Boris NEDELKOFF, as was NERO, and received his training with NERO. DIO had the same mission and was parachuted at the same time as the latter.

The radio documents concerning DIO and NERO were recovered among the papers of the Leitstelle.

Raum III (Zone III). This zone is in the Black Sea area, bounded on the north by the Bulgarian frontier, on the south by the Turkish frontier, on the west by a line going north and south through Rasgrad, and on the east by the Black Sea.

Three agents, two of whom were W/T operators, were dropped together between Sliven and Burgas in this zone at the beginning of March 1945. One was GUGUTSCHKOFF (phonetic) alias BELLO who had been given a transmitter-receiver set which worked on a battery, twenty gold pieces (French 20 franc pieces), 100,000 levas, a machine gun, two pistols and two or three grenades. GUGUTSCHKOFF had as his mission to make contact with the Organisation Legionär through Mitko (?) MANDAROFF alias MUEZZIN, one of the leading members of the Bulgarian anti-communist movement and who had been established in his position at the time of Operation TRITON. MUEZZIN had been an inspector in the Bulgarian secret police and undoubtedly has been in hiding since the Russian occupation. At the beginning of April, after he was parachuted, GUGUTSCHKOFF made contact with the centrale WIESE at Obing but he had not sent a report before the dissolution of the centrale at Obing. Hauptmann ZIESLER believes that GUGUTSCHKOFF can still be contacted although nothing had been arranged for in case of a German defeat.

The second of the three agents was Hans KRATSCHKEFF alias WURMI and the third agent was DOITSCHKINOFF alias BOMER. Both these agents were parachuted with GUGUTSCHKOFF and had the same training, equipment and mission as he.

The radio plan for GUGUTSCHKOFF and KRATSCHKEFF was found among the Leitstelle radio documents in the mountains near Fertissau. In addition GUGUTSCHKOFF is mentioned in the radio plan of the station established at the beginning of May 1945 on the Lampon-Joch near Fertissau and which was supposed to maintain contact with certain agents.

Raum IV (Macedonia) and Raum V (Mediterranean area) were not provided with agents. The four agents, mentioned above, who were trained for Zone IV did not finish their training until later and were sent back to the Bulgarian Organisation Legionär.

Descriptions

Raum I

Lieutenant Boris NEDELKOFF alias NORMANN: 1972; 25 years;

known in Bulgarian military circles and among members of the Organisation Legionär. Speaks only Bulgarian.

Raum II

Doitschia HEDELKOFF alias KERO; 1m76; 30 years old; thin; brown hair; engineer by profession; speaks German and Bulgarian; formerly 1st Lt. in the reserves of the Bulgarian Army; worked for two years in Vienna for a German firm.

BRAGANOFF alias DIO; 1m75; 24 years old; thin; dark blond hair; speaks German and Bulgarian; son of one of the chiefs of police at Sofia; father executed by the Russians; was a student in Sofia.

Raum III

SUGUTSCHKOFF (phonetic) alias BELLO; 1m78; 23 years old; thin; brown hair; speaks German and Bulgarian; lives at Burgas.

Mitko (?) MANDAROFF alias MUEZZIN; to be contacted by SUGUTSCHKOFF; ca. 1m75; 42-45 years old; heavy; brown hair; grey blue eyes; round face; always clean-shaven; dresses in European clothes; very calm.

Riano KRATSCHEFF alias NURMI; 1m75; 24 years old; thin; black hair; speaks German and Bulgarian; student.

DOITSCHKINOFF alias DOBRE; 1m76; 24 years old; thin; black hair; black moustache; speaks German and Bulgarian; cousin of Boris HEDELKOFF

The information on PA1 was obtained from BAUER and SIEGLER. TUMBLER, whose interrogation will be more exhaustive, has not yet been arrested as far as we know. All the documents mentioned above have been sent to SHAEP CI War Room, London.

Operations and Agents of Referat PA2

This Referat was under the orders of Lieutenant BRÜGGEBOE. Under his jurisdiction were Yugoslavia and Greece and to carry out the missions Frontaufklärungskommando 201 and Frontaufklärungstruppe 215, 221, 223 and 219 were to be employed. As BRÜGGEBOE is still at liberty, as far as we know, our knowledge of the operations of this referat is fragmentary.

This referat was organized into three unternehmen.

1. AISOL

In January 1945 FAK 201 sent one of the Bulgarian nationalist leaders GAFER DEVA with a group of twenty Albanians to the Leitstelle at Vienna. This group asked moral support by means of propaganda for the Albanian nationalists. It was arranged that anti-communist tracts, translated into Albanian, would be dropped in Albania but it was not planned to send any agents. SIEGLER is unable to say whether this operation took place or not and none of the other members of the Leitstelle at present in our hands is able to give any information on the operation.

2. FOLLEX

into the operation except to arrange the parachuting with Kommando KLARA. At the end of December 1944, a number of agents were dropped, but by error they jumped 150 kms from the agreed point which was in the region northeast of Salonika. The agents were arrested by the British.

3. VUK

This operation was concerned with organizing a group of Serb nationalists under the Serbian Minister LJOTIC. Its purpose was to combat communism. Practically, PAK 201 was responsible for the operation with the assistance of the Leitstelle. LJOTIC was killed accidentally in February 1945.

VUK I. A group of twenty Serbs was to stay behind the lines after the German retreat with a Serb radio operator to maintain contact. No message was transmitted or, at least was not received.

VUK II. Thirty Serb partisans of LJOTIC were trained at a camp in Kaiserwald near Graz. The names of two members of the group are known: Oberleutnant LENHAG, a Serb, and Leutnant WUENSCH, a German. WUENSCH was parachuted in January 1945 in the mountains of the region around Moulje with a W/T transmitter. The fate of the group is not known.

VUK III. At the same time as VUK II, thirty other Serbs were in training at Kaiserwald. They were to be parachuted later but the operation never took place and they returned to the Serb Legion near Trieste.

Leutnant BRUGGEBOS is evidently the only member of the Leitstelle who would be in a position to furnish information on these operations.

Among the radio documents of the Leitstelle were found the radio plans of four agents all operating in Yugoslavia, of whom three were under Oberleutnant BRUGGEBOS: (the names given to the agents are those of their posts) KALMAN, who transmitted in Serb and who was in the region of Kopaonik. KALMAN had two W/T sets. BRUGGEBOS is described on KALMAN's radio plan as the fuhrende offizier; ALGOL I, the radio plan dated 3 March 1945 states that the agent was to be parachuted 23 March 1945 and the station, theoretically, was to be in the region of Skoplje. The messages were to be translated into German. The fuhrende offizier was BRUGGEBOS; BLAGO, the radio plan dated 31 January 1945 and the language used was Serb. The region of operation was Kopaonik. This agent was to send tactical and meteorological information. BRUGGEBOS was again fuhrende offizier; DUJAN, the station was to operate in the region of Belgrade. The agent had two W/T sets. The name of BRUGGEBOS is not mentioned.

4. KINO

This operation was to attempt to sabotage on a large scale the Allied gasoline dumps in the Middle East. It is rather difficult to ascertain in what way the Leitstelle was connected with this operation which never took place. The only Leitstelle officer concerned with KINO was Leutnant BRUGGEBOS.

Operations and Agents of Referat FA3

This Referat was under the orders of Lieutenant Alfred PIFF, whose jurisdiction extended to Roumania and Hungary. For the execution of his operations PIFF employed FAK 206 and FAKs 201, 204, 213, 202 and 250.

The Referat organized the following special operations:

1. URANUS I

This undertaking was begun before the Leitstelle existed and was completely carried out by FAK 205. The only part the Leitstelle played in the operation was to receive the documents pertaining to it. These documents have been recovered and sent to the War Room. The operation was concerned with the establishment of sabotage, arms and food depots in Hungary.

2. URANUS II

This operation was concerned with building an anti-communist resistance movement in Hungary. All preparations for URANUS II were made by FAK 206, the Leitstelle merely supervising. Agents were recruited and trained but never placed.

3. REGULUS

About the 20 September 1944 PIFF was ordered to organize an operation for Roumania which was to be known by the code name REGULUS. The purpose of the operation was to infiltrate agents into Roumania who were to create an atmosphere favorable to the German counter-offensive, to reform the anti-communist nationalist groups and to send political, economic, social and military information. They were strictly forbidden to commit any acts of sabotage, a prerogative of SKORZENY's.

In order to obtain the necessary personnel for this undertaking, PIFF, on orders from Oberstleutnant FECHNER, was to get in touch with Horia SIMA, chief of the Roumanian Iron Guard at that time at the Hotel Imperial, Vienna. SIMA had 360 Iron Guard members at his disposition. These men had recently been liberated from Buchenwald where they had been interned for two years because of the conflict between SIMA and ANTONESCU. The latter had been backed by the Germans. SIMA agreed to put some of his men at the disposition of PIFF, although expressing surprise that so many people were asking aid of him. In fact, SKORZENY, a short time before, had made a similar request and had recruited 150 men.

A group of fifteen men was put at the disposal of the Leitstelle and PIFF turned them over to Oberstleutnant ROTZEL of Nachrichten Regiment 506 for training as radiooperators. They began their training on 26 September 1944 at Breitenfurt near Vienna. At the beginning of October when it became evident that the agents would be ready to leave on their missions by the end of November, PIFF again got in touch with SIMA in order to obtain supplementary personnel who were to be formed into groups and parachuted separately, each group with two W/T operators and a certain number of agents. PIFF obtained thirty-seven agents from SIMA. They were trained by Lehrregiment Kurfürst at

Lochenwalde near Berlin. The instruction was particularly concerned with physical preparation for their missions and with the handling of explosives. As all these agents were already specialists in political subversion, that part of the training was omitted.

In the middle of November 1944 all the agents were brought to Breitenfurt. There were fifty-one agents in all, of whom fourteen were W/T operators. Three potential radio operators had been eliminated during the training course. PIFF then got in touch with Kommando KLARA (Gruppe I of Luftgeschwader 200) which was located at the Wiener-Neustadt airport. Kommando KLARA was responsible for parachuting agents.

When everything had been arranged with the Kommando PIFF returned to Breitenfurt with SIMA and organized the agents into seven groups. Each group was made up of two W/T operators with a transmitting-receiving set of battery type No. 109/3. Each agent was given five gold pieces and 300,000 leis. The agents of Groups III, VI, and VII received in addition 5000 roubles as they were to be parachuted into a region of Roumania where roubles were used as currency. In addition, they received items which could be used in exchange for food, such as lighters and flints, and saccharine. Each agent had a 45 pistol and each group had two Walther PPK 32s with silencers. Each agent had a Beretta machine gun and each radio operator a wrist watch. They also had enough explosive to destroy their equipment if the need arose.

GROUP I

This group was made up of six agents. The head of the group, VERCA, was also one of the radio operators. The other W/T operator was Nicolae BALANESCU; another agent of the group was OODILA. The name of the radio station was STUNA. They were to work south of Banat and were to be parachuted 50kms southeast of Iagoj. They were dropped during the night 9-10 December 1944 and by error landed 50 kms to the east of the town. Their radio was damaged in the landing but they succeeded a few days later in making contact with another group PRINZ EUGEN which transmitted their messages to the centrale at Vienna. At the landing two members of the group were separated from the others and came down in the village of Maria. Some shots were exchanged with the Roumanian police but they succeeded in escaping and rejoined the rest of the group. They then went toward the valley of the river Timisoara where they were supposed to have been parachuted. BALANESCU took the transmitter to Timisoara (Temesvar) to be repaired by an electrician. BALANESCU was arrested by the Roumanian police probably for a reason that had nothing to do with the fact that he was a W/T operator. He managed to escape two days later. The receiver was repaired and the station PRINZ EUGEN continued to maintain contact with the centrale.

As Group II (MALSKI) and Group III (MARZAN) also had trouble with their radios the Leitstelle decided to send three new sets and radio plans to the three groups. The operation took place 11 March 1945 but the aircraft did not find the spot agreed on for the parachuting and crashed on its return to Wiener-Neustadt. The operation was repeated successfully on 23 March. Three transmitters were drowned.

MARZAN III, STUNA III and MARZAN I, made almost immediate contact with the centrale but MAISKI was never heard. At the beginning of April STUNA announced that it would maintain the traffic of MAISKI, and that of the latter having been damaged at the time of the parachuting. From then on STUNA sent messages almost every day and the location of the station was never changed. The traffic took place in Roumania and the messages were mainly concerned with information about the anti-communist movement in the Banat. According to STUNA, the movement was made up of about three thousand active members with at least one representative in a village. STUNA also sent some military information although not trained for that. This station was included in the list of agents which the Leitstelle was to contact from its centrale located on the Lampeen Joch at a height of 2600 meters.

DESCRIPTIONS

Afilon VERCA: 32 years old; 1m68; thin; round face; brown hair; nervous, very active and intelligent; moustache. Comes from the Banat.

Nicolae BALANESCU: 35 years old; 1m70; thin; round face; dark hair; calm; moustache. School teacher; comes from Timisoara (Temesvar).

CODILA: 35 years old; 1m70; big; round face; dark blond hair; calm; athletic type. Come from the Banat.

GROUP II

This group was made up of eight agents. The head of the group, GLIGOR, was also one of the radio operators. The second W/T operator was Alfred POPESCU. The code name of the radio station was MAISKI. The group was parachuted during the night 12-13 December 1944, and, as arranged, landed 40kms to the east of Arad. They never transmitted directly but first through EUGEN and later through STUNA.

DESCRIPTIONS

Cantenir GLIGOR: 38 years old; 1m80; thin; long face; moustache; nervous. Comes from the north of the Banat.

Alfred POPESCU: 25 years old; 1m72; medium build; round face; light blond hair; phlegmatic. Student; comes from Bucharest.

GROUP III

This group was made up of eight agents. The chief of the group, GRIMALSCHI, was also one of the radio operators. The second W/T operator was MARUSCA. The following agents were also members of the group: BRAGU, ACHIMESCU and Aurel GHIRAS. The code name of the station was MARZAN. The group was parachuted during the night 12-13 December 1944 50kms south southeast of Timisoara. They sent their first message three or four days later. They made contact with the centrale about five times a week except when they moved their station which occurred about three times. They sent the same type of report as STUNA but never any military information. They operated in Central Transylvania.

mentioned as described above, no message was received from them, but their signal was intercepted once by the centrals. MARIAN is one of the stations included in those that the Leitstelle hoped to contact from the new central set up in the mountains near Sarghau.

DESCRIPTIONS

David GRIMALSCHI: 32 years old; 1m72; thin; oval face; blond hair; leader type; calm. Law student at Cluj; comes from the Moldau.

MARUSCA: 24 years old; 1m62; thin; oval face; black hair; childish appearance; vivacious. Student; comes from Cluj.

Amel GHIRA: 28 years old; 1m63; fat; round face; blond hair; full of life. Student; comes from Metzenland.

BRASU: no description available.

ACHIMESCU: no description available.

GROUP IV

This group was made up of seven agents, the chief of whom was TOMA. SIBORCHENONI was one of the radio operators. RIFF does not remember the name of the second operator. The name of the post was CORNIP. They were to be parachuted 40 kms. south of Bilin (?) but an error of 30 kms. was made. At the time of the landing the Roumanian police was on their track but they managed to escape. Their first message was received two or three days after their arrival. Contact was lost but was reestablished through MARIAN. The reason for the break in contact is not known but RIFF thinks that it was because of a defect in the radio equipment.

DESCRIPTIONS

Nicodin TOMA: 27 years old; 1m78; medium build; light hair; lively and active. Comes from Transylvania.

SIBORCHENONI: 35 years old; 1m75; medium build; oval face; blond hair; calm. Comes from Transylvania.

GROUP V

This group was made up of six agents, the chief of whom was Leon MARENHAY. MARCA, who was killed in landing, was the name of one of the radio operators. FLORINSCU was another member of the group. The V/T transmitter was destroyed in landing. The code name of the post was GALO. The group never carried on any radio activity and this information was transmitted through GROUP VI.

GROUP VI

This group was made up of eight agents. Dimitra RENU, one of the radio operators, was the chief. SUTU or SUTHA was the second operator. The code name of the station was SUTHU. The group was parachuted 100 kms. west of Brasov instead of 15 kms. to the southwest of that town. They started transmitting the second day after the landing. They sent very detailed political and military information, particularly on the deportation of Germans from Transylvania. After their arrival they moved their station

into the mountains near Brasov at an altitude of about 1200 meters. They made contact with and employed a group of German prisoners who had escaped from the Russians. Their zone of action was the Simina-Brasov region. One of their messages said that their V/T set had been damaged by the cold and it was decided to send them a new battery. Contact with the group was broken, however, and through GROUP VII (LOPA) the Leitstelle learned that in the middle of February 1945 the group NUTU had had a fight with the Roumanian police but that all the members had escaped.

DESCRIPTIONS (GROUP V)

Ion MANDREANU: 35 years old; 1m72; medium build; oval face; black hair; calm; type of leader. Comes from Gran-sylvania.

Vasile PASCA: 32 years old; 1m72; medium build; oval face; naive. Dead.

Stelian FLORESCU: 35 years old; 1m75; medium build; long face; black hair; calm; moustache. Comes from Brasov.

DESCRIPTIONS (GROUP VI)

Dimitra MONU: 40 years old; 1m82; well-built; long face; black hair; calm. Comes from Brasov.

SUTU or SUTRA: about 35 years old; 1m70; fat; round face; light blond hair; obliging; calm. Teacher. Comes from Prahova-Tal.

GROUP VII

This group was made up of eight agents, the chief of whom was JOVIN. The radio operators were Nicolas POPESCU and CIUPALA. FOLISTIU and PITICARU were also members of the group. They landed 30 kms west of Brasov instead of to the south west. The code name of their station was LOPA. They established contact about fifteen days after their arrival and after they had reached the region of the oil wells of Ploesti and the neighborhood of Buzarest where they were supposed to operate. This group quickly established an excellent network which supplied the best political information received by the Leitstelle. CIUPALA at one time sent a message saying that he had been contacted by a British agent, who, because of the close watch kept by the Russians, was unable to accomplish anything and was anxious to employ members of the Iron Guard. PIFF told CIUPALA to refrain from mixing in the affair.

LOPA, having lost its calibration coil, sent a message through one of the stations of Referat Roumania of Art VI in the Bucarest region. AUBER, chief of the referat, re-transmitted the message to PIFF and received PIFF's response. At the end of February the station broke off after having announced the arrest of POPESCU.

DESCRIPTIONS

Nicolas POPESCU: 26 years old; 1m73; thin; oval face; black hair; nervous; intelligent. Student. Comes from Prahova-Tal.

Vasile JOVIN: 45 years old; 1m75; very thin; long face; grey hair; very calm; ponderous. Comes from the Banat; lived in Bucarest.

CIUPALA: 35 years old; 1m73; thin; long face; blond hair; calm. Worked for the railroad. Comes from Praheva-Tal.

POLISTIU: 27 years old; 1m70; thin; round face; blond hair; comes from Bukovina.

PITICARU: Comes from Bukovina.

GROUP VIII

About 15 December 1944 a telegram was sent by Army Group South to the Wehrmachtführungstab and to the Leitstelle drawing attention to the fact that in certain regions of the Banat there were German prisoners who had escaped from the Russians and who were in need of assistance. An order was issued to send out guides to help the prisoners. FECHNER ordered PIFF to get in contact again with SIMA in order to obtain the necessary personnel. SIMA supplied three of his men but no radio operator. PIFF applied to Hauptmann MANGELSDORFF of Nachrichten Regiment 506 who furnished him with a German W/T operator, Gefreiter TUSCHER. PIFF remembers the names of two members of the Iron Guard, HORODNICHANU and Vasile RATRU. This group was dropped during the night of 17-18 December 1944 in the south of the Banat and they began to transmit immediately after the landing. They never found the so-called group of escaped prisoners. On the other hand they succeeded in establishing contact with the group STUHA and later with MARIAN. They maintained radio contact until the end. The centrals in the mountains still received the signal of FRANK BUCHER.

DESCRIPTIONS

Klaus TUSCHER: 19 years old; 1m70; medium build; round face; blond hair; calm and courageous. German, speaking only German. Came from Berlin. Chief of the group.

HORODNICHANU: 35 years old; 1m68; fat; round face; blond hair; lively. Comes from the Banat.

Vasile RATRU: 27 years old; 1m70; long face; thin; black hair; naive. Student. Comes from the Banat.

Groups IV, V, VI, and VII were parachuted from the same plane about 21 December 1944. They all landed very far from the pre-arranged spot.

4. GILL

This operation was conceived as complementary to Operation REGULUS. The experience of REGULUS had proved that the distance from the centrals often caused delay in making radio contact. In addition, the agents were not technicians and were incapable of making the simplest repairs. These facts made a parachute operation necessary for technical reasons. It was decided, therefore, to establish a central near Bessar which would serve as a focal point for the agents and which would retransmit messages to Vienna. Also, this central would ensure communication between the various agents' stations. Technischer Gill of the RHM Vienna was put in charge of

of the operation. At the beginning of March SIMA was asked to supply fifteen to twenty-five men. The men were sent to Breitenfurt for training as radio technicians and at the end of April were ready to leave. They were given twelve or thirteen transmitters, one of which was very powerful. However, they did not leave because Kommando KLARA had no more gasoline for its airplanes and, in addition, Amt VI B in the person of AUMER forbade the undertaking on the pretext that all radio operations in the Balkans were exclusively the business of Amt VI B.

All radio plans of Operation REGULUS have been recovered and sent to the War Room.

5. SIRIUS

This undertaking was assigned to FAK 205 and later to BAT 217 under Kommando 20. It was to establish a network of agents in Slovakia. Lieutenant SCHOLZ of the Leitstelle was responsible for supervision of SIRIUS and he spent all of his time on it after he was attached to BAT 217 in December 1944.

CONCLUSION

This summary does not attempt to give a complete picture of all of the activities and undertakings of Leitstelle II Sud-Ost but rather it attempts to give as faithful a picture as possible of the achievements of this organization as seen in operation. The information contained in this report is derived principally from the interrogations of Hauptmann ZIEGLER (concerning Bulgaria), Lieutenant PIFF (concerning Operation REGULUS), Lieutenant BAUER (concerning Operation VUK), and of Oberstleutnant FECHNER. The documents which were recovered with the aid of ZIEGLER have been used only slightly because of their purely technical nature.

This summary should, however, be sufficient to establish that the radio networks of the Leitstelle seen as a whole arose from the same necessity. Despite lack of information on the Serbian networks, the same is probably true for them. In fact, among the documents recovered, there is "Verkehrs Plan KRANICH" which is nothing more than the radio plan for the centrale installed at the beginning of May on the Lampoen-Josh near Partisan. This plan was to include all the radio agents when the Germans thought it was still possible to contact at the moment of the surrender. The plan includes six stations: FRANK EUGEN, STUNA 3, MAISKY, MARIAN, HELLO and BLACO, four in Roumania, one in Bulgaria and one in Serbia. It is necessary, however, to eliminate two of the Roumanian stations: MAISKY, in fact, never transmitted and MARIAN never sent a message directly, its call signal having been intercepted only once. HELLO established contact with the centrale but never sent any messages. Concerning BLACO there is not enough information. It should be noted, moreover, that this plan does not include certain stations, such as KAMIL, which at that period could have been contacted. Judging from the facts as provided by the headquarters of the Leitstelle these networks were more or less in a state of dissolution at the time of the German surrender. Certain individual stations were able to survive but the system as a whole was discontinued. The networks were not set up to carry on by themselves; they were established with the idea that the Wehrmacht would re-

anti-communist. Therefore suspect in the eyes of the Russians and obliged to take refuge in the mountains as soon as the Germans withdrew from the territory. RAUER explains this contradiction by saying that even in the mountains they would have been able to obtain useful information and would have put themselves immediately at the disposition of the German troops on their return. The first important operation which would have permitted the radio operators to carry on, maintaining a central direction on the spot and with the necessary repairs was Unternehmen GILL which never took place. The Leitstelle did not have the time to change its networks so that they could continue to function.

The exploitation of the networks, as they exist at the present time, is not, therefore, of great interest. The information which the greater part of the agents can supply is probably not as valuable as a press release. In addition, the material difficulties to be overcome are large if only taking into consideration the fact that the transmissions take place in unfamiliar languages.

The greatest argument against exploitation of the networks, except for the OK phases, lies in the attitude of the officers of the Leitstelle. Oberstleutnant FROHNER, Hauptmann LIEGLER and Lieutenant RAUER claim that their only thought during the last months was to establish contact with the Allies in the west, and that succeeding, they decided to protect the important documents, such as the radio archives. FROHNER believes that a war between the Western Powers and Russia is inevitable and he puts his networks at the disposition of the Western Allies in the hope that he will be rewarded. It has not been possible to determine to what extent this idea of collaboration with the Allied intelligence services includes also the idea of using these same services as a basis of their operations.

The reactivation of these networks as proposed by the German intelligence service presents not only serious difficulties, supposing that it is possible to reactivate the networks, but also many real risks. In fact, the case of the Leitstelle can be studied separately, that is, without comparing it to similar cases which have been encountered during the last few months. While it has been exceedingly difficult to determine real organization of the German networks in the West, it has been possible to obtain a fairly precise idea of the German services working against the Russians.

The German strategy is marked by several stages. The first phase consists in trying to turn the Allies against each other, and at the same time trying to continue the existence of the German intelligence services. The second phase consists in using the power of Allied organizations in order to begin again to work for purely German objectives. In order to re-establish these radio contacts, the collaboration of one or several members of the staff of the Leitstelle is necessary and thus the means of achieving their first aim is given them. If it is necessary, however, to give up the idea of employing the staff of the Leitstelle as a whole so that their objective is not achieved, that does not exclude the possibility of employing certain members of the Leitstelle, including the officers themselves, if a definite plan is conceived, a plan which will not further the purposes of the Leitstelle.

CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES FOREIGN BUREAU
888 MISSION FOR GERMANY
X-2 BRANCH
AFO 655

9th August 1945

To: Capt. Eric TIDM, Munich

Subject: Directed Interrogation of Oberstlt. FROBNER

1. QUB, USFET has requested that the following questions be put to FROBNER. The questions are quoted as submitted.

a) Full details of attempts to sabotage British shipping in St. George's Bay, Greece at the beginning of the war.

b) List of all undertakings known to FROBNER in or concerning the following countries. The list should include, wherever possible, name of undertaking; date; objective; in what country; directed by whom; from where; controlling agency.

Greece, North Africa, Italy, Egypt, South Africa, Afghanistan, India, Persia, Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, South America, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France.

Statements by FROBNER that such-and-such an officer of Mil D would know more about a certain country are of no interest in the sense that we still want his information.

c) Names and cover names of all Abv. II and Mil D agents, with date as to their use and controlling officers.

d) My previous questions sent by Major EVANS to Third Army, not so far answered.

e) Full particulars, including real name, and activities of BOLIVAR.

2. Please push details to this office as soon as completed.

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of

Col W. S. Lacey by

L. F. [Signature]

ANDREW H. BENDIGO
Lt. Colonel, A.C.
Commanding

Distribution:

- 1 - CO, SOI Munich
- 1 - Major J. B. GAKES (Attn. Lt. Williams)
- 1 - Ops File

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AB 012 THIRD DAY

9 August 1945

AB010

~~ROUTINE~~

- A. AB/006 INVESTIGATING INTERVIEWING DEPT PAMPHLET WE DISCUSSED ON PHONE.
- B. FECHNER CAN BE RELEASED BUT CIB WANTS TO KNOW HIS FUTURE ADDRESS AND YOUR PROPOSED MEANS OF CONTROL.
- C. BELIEVE ALSO CAN ARRANGE RELEASE OF GROUP IN PARA ABLE EVEN IF AUTOMATIC ARREST CATEGORY IF YOU CAN GET HERE BY FAST POUCH PERTINENT DETAILS ON EACH.
- D. DETAILS SHOULD INCLUDE STATEMENT ON EACH GIVING BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS, PROPOSED PLAN OF EMPLOYMENT, FUTURE ADDRESS, MEANS OF CONTROL, DETAILS OF ARREST.
- E. USUAL INFORMATION ON PETER ABLE CASES WOULD SUFFICE.

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by [signature]
On W. & LeRoy by [signature]
311 2 8 1945
[signature]
[signature]

TFP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Confidential

UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER
OSS MISSION FOR GERMANY
2-2 DIA 1
APO 625

#2118

23 July 1945

To: CO, SOI Detachment Munich

Subject: Release of Obalt. FACHNER - ref. your memo of 14 June.

1. The chief X-2/OSS Germany is in agreement with your suggestion that Obalt. FACHNER be released and returned to his home in Fertisen.

2. It is requested that the recommendation for FACHNER's release be submitted by the CO SOI Munich to Chief CIB, 3rd Army.

Regraded **CONFIDENTIAL** by authority of
Col W. S. LeRoy by CE Phillips ad LI ORDO

VER 10 1945

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - SAINT LONDON
- 1 - SAINT WASHINGTON
- 1 - Chief CIB, G-2, USFET ✓
- 1 - CO, SOI Munich
- 1 - Sys. File

56

Confidential

Confidential

INCOMING

884

1-2

091450

IC0815

10 July 1945

TO: CROWN

FROM: WAR OFF LONDON

REF YOUR AMZON 060 RE FERIL.

A. RAPS TO FERIL WILL BE FOUND IN YOUR REPORTS ON FRED KOCH SUGAR POINT IL290 AND ROGER BLANT 100. NAME INCORRECTLY SPLIT FERIL AS WELL AS FECHNER. MAY BE WISE TO DEAL WITH POINTS RAISED IN OUR VAB 5684 RE KOCH REPORTS.

B. GOTTHARD GAVEN NO AC ON 2020 STATES THAT FERIL WAS WITH KLO 201 TILL ABOUT 44 WHEN HE MOVED TO MIL. ANT DOG REPERAT SUDOST AND THAT HE HAD EXCEPTIONALLY GOOD CONTACTS IN GREECE.

C. FURTHER TRACES IF ANY WILL FOLLOW SOONEST.

D. SUGGEST THAT FERIL SHOULD JOIN EISENBERG AND FECHNER GROUP AT MIKE FOR ITEM UNIT 4 FOR FULL INTERROGATION IN VIEW OF HIS PART IN ROMAN 2 ACTIVITIES IN BALKANS AND RECENT POSITION AS HEAD OF REPERAT SUDOST. EISENBERG, FECHNER GROUP AND FERIL OUGHT BETWEEN THEM TO PRODUCE FULL ACCOUNT OF ABT ROMAN 2 SUDOST ACTIVITIES.

59

Fechner is at 3:15 AM
Hale